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II

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Call the matter of

7

Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC versus Babcock and this is

8

the Morgan case.

9

960500010.

See if I can refer to the number.

First of all welcome to our court here in

10

Ogden.

11

also apologize for some delay since we tried this case

12

in getting the decision to you.

13

and it's just taken some time to get back to you.

14

Appreciate you folks making the trip here.

I

I've been fairly busy

Start off by making the observation that this

15

is a decision the court is going to make on the record

16

with the parties present, following a several-day trial

17

that was conducted in Morgan.

18

counsel, in the way the case was presented, and I've

19

had a chance to review the facts and evidence before

20

me, the exhibits, and also the trial briefs that have

21

been submitted, and I'd

22

issue my decision in this case

23

My compliments to you,

imw go into my findings and

First of all, by way of general observation

24

the ground that is in dispute that is clear between the

25

parties is what's turned out to be kind of a
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1

triangular-shaped piece of property.

2

triangle that exists between the actual survey line and

3

the location of the fence line that was established by

4

the Williams family, the predecessors in interest to

5

the Defendant Babcocks.

6

And it is the

The ground in dispute was homesteaded by the

7

Williams family in the 1800s.

8

States government in this case contained a description

9

that followed the section lines or quarter-section

10

lines, and created parcels of ground that had four

11

square corners.

12

defendants' predecessors in interest but also of the

13

Wilkinsons' adjoining piece of ground.

14

on the triangular piece that is in question have always

15

been paid by the defendants or their predecessors in

16

interest.

17

The deed from the United

This was also true not only of the

Property taxes

I find from the evidence that was presented

18

that two fences had existed on the boundary line -- and

19

when I say the boundary line in this case, the actual

20

survey line, consistent with the survey line -- and

21

that those fences, evidence of those fences existing

22

was presented in the form of some testimony and

23

photographs of the old fence posts and some old wire in

24

the area.

25

number of years, and that the only existing fence

Those fences have not existed I find for a
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1

between the parcels of property was the fence line that

2

took off on somewhat of a diagonal direction, and is

3

along the line that is the line that is claimed by the

1

plaintiffs Wilkinsons in this case.

5

I find that that fence line that takes off on

6

the diagonal has been the only fence in that area for

7

well over 20 years.

8

Daryl Meacham in the case about a more recent creation

9

of not only that diagonal fence but the fence along the

There was some testimony from

10

actual survey line.

11

testimony was helpful, and in some parts it was

12

somewhat inconsistent with other testimony given.

13

I find on balance from the facts that it's been over 20

14

years since a fence existed on the actual survey line.

15

And I find that from the overall testimony and from the

16

physical descriptions of what was found on the actual

17

survey line.

18

The court believes that that

But

With regard to plaintiffs' use of the ground

19

I find that the plaintiffs' livestock, to the extent at

20

times there was livestock in that area, have been able

21

to roam and graze up to the diagonal fence line; and I

22

find that plaintiffs have also planted somewhat on the

23

disputed triangular piece, but not up to the fence

24

line, and certainly not 100 percent of the property.

25

I'd approximate that more in the nature of about 5 0
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1

percent of the ground, and that varied somewhat from

2

time to time.

3

There was some time spent on the plaintiffs'

4

side of the case concerning minutes from planning

5

commission meetings as the defendant Babcocks were

6

attempting to get a subdivision approved, and reference

7

to the Babcocks not including this ground for purposes

8

of getting their subdivision approved.

9

that that's somewhat of a red herring in the case

The court finds

10

because the reason the Babcocks did that is to be able

11

to say to the planning commission, "We want the

12

subdivision approved.

13

triangular piece, and just for the sake of approval of

14

the subdivision we're proposing, leave it out."

15

We have a dispute over the

Then they were able to get the subdivision

16

approved that they were proposing, but it was still

17

clear that the triangular piece was in dispute.

So I

18 [I don't find in any way that the Babcocks had given up
19 || their claim or their dispute that they should be the
20 || owners of that triangular piece.
21 ||

There was also some testimony about

22 II potentially statements made to give an indication that
23 || that was given up, but I find that the Exhibit No. 1
24 || that was introduced that was the agreement, it clearly
25 || covers that there is an area that was in dispute -- and
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I
2

I

believe it f s paragraph 2 on page 2.

And it says:

"Boundary line dispute exists relative to

3

the existing fence line located along the

4

south boundary of the Fox Hollow Subdivision.

5

Parties do not intend to resolve that dispute

6

by this agreement, and reserve their claims

7

relative to that dispute."

8

This was signed by both parties and it clearly covers

9

that issue.

10

I f ll continue on with some facts in a moment,

11

but right at this point I'd like to observe that, as

12

has been agreed by the parties, in order for there to

13

be a boundary line by acquiescence there would have to

14

be "occupation up to a visible line marked by

15

monuments, fences, or buildings; mutual acquiescence in

16

the line as a boundary for a long period of time by

17

adjoining landowners."

18

that the occupation up to the visible line, which would

19

be the d i a g o n a l

20

Now, certainly the court rules

fence line, that that e l e m e n t

is m e t .

That N o . 3, "for a long p e r i o d of t i m e , " w a s

21

met as I found already I believe that was for well over

22

2 0 years, and the parties were adjoining landowners.

23

The tougher question, and it's one the

24

attorneys have dealt with and I think know well in

25

yours briefs, is this question of mutual acquiescence

JANE G. SAVILLE, C.S.R.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
f o m ^ con

n^rn

1

in the line as a boundary.

I think attorneys and

2

judges for ages have struggled with what acquiescence

3

means.

4

case that acquiescence can mean indolence.

5

cited a case that points out factually that we had a

6

landowner there that didn't even realize that they were

7

being occupied on the lands that belonged to them by

8

way of survey, and the courts have held that not even

9

knowing about it could be indolence on your part, and

It's been argued by Mr. Echard's side of the
And they've

10

that that could qualify for the element of mutual

11

acquiescence in the line as a boundary.

12

Now, in that case that was cited by Mr.

13

Echard there had been a building built in that area,

14

grazing of animals, and I don't recall but it seems to

15

me there may have been some crop growth that had gone

16

on in that area.

17
18

Based on the strength of that case and on the
overall evidence in this case of the occupation in the

19 II area, the court believes that the presumption has been
20 || met on the side of the plaintiffs' side of this case to
21 || suggest that there may have been a boundary line by
22 || acquiescence.

But I can only get there if I view the

23 || phrase acquiescence as incorporating indolence and just
24 || not taking any action to kick someone off of the
25 || disputed property.
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1

The defense in this case has argued that,

2

well, even if the court finds that, that the court

3

should go further and take a look at whether the

4

presumption could be rebutted by the purpose of the

5

fence when it was installed, and by the true boundary

6

being whether it was unknown or uncertain.

7

this case as I said in the beginning, the original deed

8

that came in from the United States government -- and

9

this would have been not only the deed that went to the

Now, in

10

Williams family, the defendants' predecessors in

11

interest, but also the Wilkinson family, called out

12

deed lines that shouldn't be real difficult to follow.

13

They create right angles, they follow section or

14

quarter-section lines.

15

this case there was confusion or needed to be confusion

16

about where the actual boundary line was.

17

And the court doesn't find in

This is a case, and I think the record

18

already will reflect, that the court, and I suppose the

19

judge along with the parties, had a chance to walk over

20

the ground, and it was very valuable.

21

topography was steeper terrain than what your models

22

depicted to me, or what I had gleaned from the

23

photographs that were presented.

24

land in this case from my perspective created somewhat

25

of a natural barrier between these adjoining property

I found that the

The topography of the
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1

owners in terms of their use of the land.

2

The area that's near where the boundary line

3

went through is quite steep, there's a cliffy area and

4

some deep swales that made fencing in this area

5

difficult.

6

graphically demonstrated.

7

I've worked on some fences over the year I've never had

8

to fence ground quite that hilly.

9

graphically demonstrated to the court when a deep swale

The court feels that it was rather
Even though I'd have to say

And it was quite

10

is attempted to be crossed with a-cattle fence that in

11

order to go down into the low portion that you are

12

fighting against the natural tension you are attempting

13

to put on the fence through the rest of the run of the

14

fence, and over time it would have a tendency to pull

15

the fence up out of the low swale and allow an area for

16

cattle to get down underneath it and escape.

17
18
19

The court finds, having walked around, having
looked at it, and having examined where the fence was
II r u n , and taking into account all of the t e s t i m o n y

2 0 II the case that the angled fence was put in and

in

it's

21 || purpose for being put in was to keep livestock in the
22 || Williams' parcel or the defendants' parcel, the
23 || defendants' predecessor in interest.

And that was its

24 || sole purpose and it was not put in in order to
25 || establish the boundary line.

10
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1

The court, based on that finding, is ruling

2

in favor of the defendants in this case, and I find

3

that the actual boundary line should be that of the

4

survey line and should follow the line where the newer

5

fence was put in after the defendants had torn out this

6

older fence that followed the angled line.

7

finding I also find that this was a legitimate dispute

8

between these parties, that they certainly had the

9

right to come to court and peacefully work out in a

In so

10

court of law.

11

should bear their own attorney's fees and costs in this

12

action.

13

that the costs should be awarded to the prevailing

14

party.

15

The court believes that each party

Not costs, excuse me, but attorney's fees, and

Now, have I left you on your side with any

16

questions, on the defense side?

17

MR. SMITH:

No, your honor.

18

THE COURT:

Mr. Echard?

19

MR. ECHARD:

20

THE COURT:

No, your honor.
All right.

I'll ask you then on

21

the defense side to prepare findings and an order for

22

the court to sign and submit those to Mr. Echard, if

23

you would, for his approval.

24
25

Again, I thank you folks, and unless there
are any questions the court will be in recess at this

11
JANE G. SAVILLE, C.S.R.
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1

time

2

MR. SMITH:

3

(Whereupon, the proceedings were

4 ||

Thank you, your honor.

concluded for the day.)

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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7
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9
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P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed with your
arguments?
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Okay, go ahead.

MR. ECHARD: Your Honor, if I could hand the Court
a copy of the transcript of the Courtrs ruling, that I
thought I had previously given to you but I thought perhaps
having one in your hand would be helpful and I've
highlighted in yellow the language which I think is
relevant to what we'll be discussing today from your
decision.

This was taken from the video and transcribed by

my secretary under my request.
What we are here today for, your Honor, is to ask
the Court to reverse its decision in this based upon an
issue of law.

We're not asking the Court to change the

findings of fact. We believe the findings of fact made by
the Court, in fact, when properly applied to the law
compels a decision in my client's favor.
In order to do that perhaps I could just
generally outline the issue as I see it and then I'll go on
and discuss in more detail in a minute.

Both parties in

their original briefs and the Court in its decision have
concluded what the issues were on, just a minute, let me

3

find it here.

On Page 3 on that transcript that I've given

on the second to the last page, the court recited where it
says XVI will continue on with some facts in a moment",
there at the bottom of that you concluded and did accept
the issues that had to be decided as indicated by the
counsel.

And that was, in order to show boundary line by

acquiescence we have the occupation to a visible line. You
found specifically that there was an occupation to a
visible line in the next paragraph.
diagram of the fence.

You said that was the

That that element was met.

Next was for a long period of time you found
specifically that it was for a long period of time in
excess

of 20 years.
Number 3, by adjoining property owners, I don't

know if you specifically said that but it was rather
obvious that they were adjoining property owners.

That was

never an issue.
And then the third one was mutual acquiescence
that the line is a boundary and that is the issue.

The

Court I believe found that we carry that burden. And 1
direct the Court's attention to the next page, the
paragraph in the center that says "based on the strength in
that case and the overall evidence in this case of the
occupation and (inaudible), the Court believes that the
presumption has been met on the plaintiff's side of this
4

case to suggest that there may have been a boundary line of
acquiescence but I can only get there if I view that the
phrase acquiescence is incorporating indolence and just not
taking any action to kick anybody off the disputed
property.

So, it seems to me that if you're saying that

it's based upon indolence that there was establishment of
acquiescence in a boundary line.
You then go back on the very last paragraph of
that page and on the top of the next paragraph where I've
highlighted it.

That said "they are great right angles",

talking about the original section line, "that that section
of quarter lines"/ and the Court doesn't find in this case
that there was confusion or needed to be confusion about
where the actual boundary line was. That is the whole crux
of the legal argument in this case in my opinion.

But I

understand the Court is saying that there wasn't a
confusion between the parties but it didn't need to be
confused.

And to that degree the Court is correct and to

find the Staker obligation as response to this.
The Court then does go on and saw# however, that
because this was not the original line that, and I'm
looking now at the bottom of that same paragraph, excuse
me, page, next to the last paragraph where I've
highlighted, that the angle fence vtas put in and its
purpose for being put in was to keep livestock from the

5

1

Williams' parcel or the defendant's parcel, the defendant's

2

predecessor-in-interest, and that was its sole purpose and

3 I was not put in in order to establish the boundary line. Of
4 I course, based on that finding is ruling for the defendants,
5 1

So, it sounds like what the court, as I

6

understand, really is saying is that all of these things

7

have been met. They were indolence in as established by the

8

cases but that because —

9

correct again —

let me get the wording here

that it was not for the purpose of

10 I establishing the boundary line.
11 I

So what the court it's saying that is a fence of

12

convenience and that, therefore, even though they occupied

13

to that fence of convenience, that was not sufficient-

14

That just doesn't

15 I Utah.

happen to be the law in the State of

And I'm sure the Court has had a chance to read our

16

memorandum.

17

memorandums the law as it is in Utah.

18

We tried to cite extensively in those

THE COURT:

I want to quote—

I might indicate to you and I think

19 I it is fair to both sides that I've looked at these as they
20

came in but because of this calendaring problem, I rely on

21

the calendar that comes to me as to what' s coming this

22

morning.

23

coming.

24
25

And I haven't read it right before you were
So you should be aware of that.
MR. ECHARD:

Well, I assume before the Court will

rule, it will go back and read it in some detail. And if

that's the case, I will try to hit the highlights and not
try to cover everything in the memorandum so as not to use
the Courtfs time. But just focusing on the issue, Halliday
versus Cluff was the case that early had been ruled by
Judge Oaks, Dallen Oaks that was on the bench that said
there had to be uncertainty, they had to be objective
uncertainty in the boundary line initially or they could
not be a determination of boundary line by acquiescence.
That was specifically overturned in Staker. And
referring to the Staker case, referring to the Halliday
case said the following, and let me read it because I think
some of the language is important, and this is quoted on
page 5 of our responsive memorandum.

Halliday and his

progeny, and I think progeny is very important because what
the Court is doing is overruling Halliday and all of his
progeny and all counsel ever quotes to you in his
memorandum is Halliday and his progeny and that was
specifically overruled by Staker and they make it very
clear.
If the Court is trying to find that, I'll wait
until you find that.
THE COURT:
MR. ECHARD:

(Inaudible)
Okay.

Would require that property

lines as shown in the record title not be displaced by
another boundary line—and I'm skipping a few things here—

7

1

if he or his predecessor in title had reason to know the

2

true boundary line during the period of acquiescence•

3

other words, there must have been a practical form of

4

dispute.

5

the burden of proving the objective uncertainty as part of

6

its prime case-

7

said and they reversed that.

8

precisely what the case is saying, the Court is saying in

9

this case, is that Halliday and is progeny said that they

10

had to be uncertainty that if they knew where the boundary

11

line was then they cannot have an acquiescence-

1 O

not the law in the State of Utah anymore*

13

parties have acquiesced and even though they knew that it

14

was not the original boundary, Utah law now says that

15

indolence can establish that element and then tthat is the

16

new boundary line.

17
18

In

The party claiming boundary by acquiescence has

That is saying that thatrs what Halliday
That seems to me to be

That is

If, in fact, the

And then Staker, it goes through and some of his
footnotes and it specifically makes the distinction of

19 I boundary by acquiescence as opposed to boundary by
20

agreement. Now when there is boundary by agreement/ you

21

have to have an objective uncertainty-

22

of boundary by agreementr it is a boundary by acquiescence.

23

And so what the Court has done in stalmr is carved out a

24

new area where it no longer makes any difference that the

25

fence line was a line of convenience or if there was a

This is not a case

dispute.

If those four elements have been met —

and

you'll note that the four elements do not include
uncertainty.

If the occupation to the visible line —

which the Court found existed —
- which you found existed —
which you found existed —

for a long period of tirae-

by adjoining property owners—

and mutual acquiescence that

it's a boundary line and that's where the case came in that
we cited, specifically where the Court, and that's Carter
versus Hamouth in 1996, where it indicated that indolence
was sufficient to establish that.
Now, counsel has pointed out in his responsive
memorandum and I don't think even counsel or I, either one,
knew at the time we were trying that case that Carter was
reversed by the Supreme Court.
beginning of our memorandum.

We talked about that in the

But the only basis on which

that was reversed was the fact that the Court recalls in
Carter, and the Court made a comment about it in its
findings, that there was a section of land that was bounded
some cliffs and the other person didn't even have access to
this other line* land and they ruled, that the person,
bringing the case could have all of it including that area
that was bounded by cliffs for indolence.

The Supreme

Court said that that area which the defendant or the owner
of the property did not have access

to because of the

natural barriers, that wasn't sufficient boundary line to

9

establish the deal*

But it went on in its cessment and I've

cited on page two of our responsive memorandum what the
court said because I think it is important the court still
recognize the indolenceCourt overruling —

It said —

this is the Supreme

during the years of ownership, the

Straiters had no access to the disputed area*
entirely in landlock.

It was

The trial court found that they

could not access it from the remainder of their property
which was on the plateau above the disputed area.

They did

not own any adjoining tract in which access could be
gained*

Because of the inability to take possession of the

disputed area,- the indolence of the Straiters cannot be
| construed to be acquiescence.
The point is that the Supreme Court did not
overrule the cistrict court - the Appellate Court's
determination that indolence was a basis.

They merely said

that factually as to that inaccessible piece of property
that that did not constitute indolence. And the Court will
remember that the Prida case recited a number of other
cases in which indolence had been specifically an issue on
the basis upon which this should be a determination.
Let me see if I can find, yeah, in the Carter
case they relied upon Lane versus

Walker a 1973 case. We

cite that on page four of our memorandum, responsive
memorandum.

In which the Supreme Court had stated that

10

acquiescence can consist of indolence or consent by
(inaudible) so the Carter court was only repeating what the
Supreme Court had previously said to that time. And
obviously the Supreme Court is saying again when they
reversed Carter that they recognize that indolence can be a
basis.

So, what I'm saying is the fact that it was

reversed did not change anything that's significant to this
case.

It was a factual determination.
So what we have is a clear law that says that if

parties have a fenced line that is used up to the fence
line regardless of whether it is a fence of convenience,
regardless of whether or not they knew about the original
line makes absolutely no difference.

Under current law, as

long as you establish those four elements, my client
prevails.

And as I see the Court's ruling, you found that

there was evidence of indolence in this particular case as
to that particular line and would have ruled in my client's
favor but for the Court's conclusion that because the line
was known or should have been known then that therefore
should not be the line in question.

And that's where we

think the Court should have an opportunity to correct the
application of the law to the facts because I don't think
the facts are disputed.
Now, I did make an objection also to the findings
prepared by counsel.

I'd like to address that separately.

11

1

Let me get though arguing this, unless the Court wants be

2

to do it right at the moment.

3

THE COURT:

You can address it separate.

4

MR, ECHARD:

5

MR. MAAK:

Thank you.

May it please the Court and counsel.

6

The plaintiffs in this case are basically making two

7

arguments to your Honor.

8

each and every element, each of the four elements combined

9

by acquiescence and, therefore, having so found the Court

The first is that the Court found

10

made a mistake not having ruled in their favor•

The

11

problem with that argument is that's not what your Honor

12

did.

13

them on the fourth element.

14

little later.

Your Honor found three elements and

15

We'll go into that detail a

The second is the plaintiffs argue that the

16

doctrine, that if a fence is installed as a cattle

17

containment barrier and not as a boundary the doctrine

18

doesn't apply and they suggest that somehow that doctrine

19

established by at least six Utah Supreme Court cases has

20

evaporated.

21

proposition, and none exists and they're wrong on that

22

point.

23

They haven't cited any case for that

Let me first talk about the elements of doctrine

24

abounded by acquiescence.

25

three elements.

Your Honor, we agree did find

You found occupation up to a visible line.

12

A second element for a long time-

A third by adjoining

land owners•
The fourth element I would like to quote because
it answers everything.
a boundary line-

Mutual acquiescence in the line as

Those words kind of get slurred when it's

quoted to you or ignoreddoctrine.

But that's the essence of the

You have two people recognizing a barrier as a

boundary, not as a cattle barrier.
I'd like to kind of take the Court through the
history of this case so that what the Court said and what
the Court did is placed in context.

The plaintiff filed a

trial brief in this case which basically relied on only one
case, Carter verus Hamereth and argued basically that

case

to the Court and no others. And Carter versus Hamereth, at
the time it was quoted to you, at the time it was cited to
you, at the time it was argued to you, had been reversed on
that point.

When the argument was briefed, when the motion

to alter or amend a judgment was filed, that case wasn't
mentioned.

It wasn't mentioned that it existed or that it

had been reversed or anything.

It was just ignored-

And in our response we pointed out that the case
was no longer good law.

And what that case said was that

on the facts of Carter versus Hamereth the Court of Appeals
said that indolence, without more, would suffice to
establish boundary by acquiescence.

13

I'd like to clarify what the facts are.

The

words landlocked have been used, lack of access have been
used.

I'd like the Court to clearly know that we are not

talking about a parcel that is sxlandlocked" in the usual
legal sense, that is surrounded by the property owned by
another.

That wasn't the case there.

tract•of land.
of a cliff.

This was 160 acre

Thirty-two acres of which were at the base

There was a geographical impediment to using

the property at the bottom from the remainder of the
owner's land.

And in that case for, undisputedly for a 60

year period, somebody other than the owner used the land at
the base of the cliff because the owner couldn't get to it
and the Court held, based on those facts, the indolence
that the lack of the assertion of a right, the lack of a
complaint about another person using your property was
sufficient to establish a boundary by acquiescence.
With that background the Court indicated its
concern about what the case said.

Your Honor said that

based upon the evidence the plaintiffs have made a showing
of indolence but that, based upon all of the evidence,
boundary by acquiescence had not been established and your
Honor identified these points.

You said both parties knew

the exact knew the exact location of the boundary.

Your

Honor even said that a fence, an old fence was installed
right on the real boundary.

Your Honor said that you

14

visited the site and you observed the fact that the slant
cattle containment fence alleged to be the boundary
obviously departed from the square boundary lines that the
party's deeds recited cited which were described in quarter
sections and half sections.

You found that the only

purpose, the only purpose of this fence line was to contain
livestock.

And I might add as a footnote that nobody can

question that finding, your Honor, because each and every
witness who testified for the Wilkinsons said in their
depositions which were published at trial, that the only
purpose of this fence was to contain livestock and that it
had no other purpose.

Every one of them said that.

In fact, Harry Wilkinson said in his deposition
that he agreed with Babcockfs predecessor, Elwood Williams,
that the fence would be maintained as a cattle containment
fence.
was.

So there is no question about what the evidence

Everybody knew and understood and expected that this

was a cattle containment fence.
Your Honor found that the cattle containment
fence was installed where it was because of the topography
of the property.

Your Honor found that it was not feasible

to install a cattle containment fence on the true boundary
because of the cliffs that your Honor walked and saw*

You

said it was not feasible to install or maintain a fence on
the true boundary.

That's very much like Carter

15

versus Hamereth.

You have the edge of a plateau in Carter

versus Hamereth which prevented access to and use of the
adjacent property.

In this case we have a geographical

feature that precluded the installation of a cattle
containment fence on the true boundary.

Very, very

similar.
THE COURT:

Let me just clarify something there.

To me the case is somewhat different than the facts in
Carter in that instead of a constant cliff, my findings are
that there are areas along that boundary line that made a
fence on the true boundary line very difficult, if not
impossible, to install and keep installed and that would
especially be true given the technology for the
installation of fences that existed back when the old
fences were being put in.

And so, I think the record

should reflect though there are areas past that steep area
on the property where the fence could have been maintained
on the boundary line but everything else you were saying is
consistent with what my findings are.
MR. MAAK:
THE COURT:
MR. MAAK:

Okay.
Okay.
And I think it is important to point

out that in Carter versus Hamereth you were not presented
with a case where it was a cattle contained fence.

The

court made no findings and made no mention that the fence

16

was installed to contain cattle.

Totally not there.

Not a

word like that in the decision•
So I'd like to read what the Court, the Supreme
Court, said when they reversed the Court of Appeals
decision that was cited to you.

Because of this inability

to take physical possession of the disputed area, the
indolence of the Shraders cannot be construed to be
acquiescence.

Let's see, the something must be attributed

to the physical inability to possess the disputed area, not
to their acquiescence in the edge of the plateau with its
cliff and ledges as the boundary.
So the reason for the acquiescence was based upon
a physical feature. Now in that respect, the two cases are
very, very similar.
as a boundary.

People have to acquiesce in the fence

In this case they couldn't acquiesce it as

a boundary because they couldn't get to it physically.
Similarly in this case, a cattle containment
fence could not feasibly be installed in the area of the
gully and cliffs on our property along the true boundary.
Now, counsel is arguing to your Honor that it's
crystal clear that whether or not the fence is a cattle
containment fence is irrelevant, that it's not the law of
this state anymore. And that's just not so.
case that says that.

There is no

There is no language that says that.

Counsel is telling you that's what the cases saying.

What

17

1

counsel needs to do is quote you the language that says

2

that because it is not there.
First, there is no arguing with the Court's

3
4

ruling that the fence was installed as a cattle containment

5

fence.

6

about that and there canft be any question as a matter of

7

fact about that because as I indicated, all of the

8

Wilkinsons testified that that was the purpose of the

9

fence. And Harry Wilkinson and Elwood Williams agreed to

10
11

Your Honor did say that, and there is not doubt

maintain it as a fence to separate their cattle.
Let's talk about how this Court has construed,

12

how our Supreme Court has construed the law of boundary by

13

acquiescence because I think there has been some confusion

14

injected into that history.

15

decided in 1984. Before that decision the Supreme Court in

16

a multitude of cases held that the doctrine of boundary by

17

acquiescence has four elements. And the four elements are

18

almost always quoted verbatim without any change

19

whatsoever.

20

Court described what boundary by acquiescence had to have

21

in order to be proved, the four element is mutual

22

acquiescence in that line as a boundary.

23

always there.

24
25

Halliday versus Cluff was

And every time before 1984 that the Supreme

The words are

And along came Halliday verus Cluff.
versus Cluff the court added a fifth factor.

In Halliday
It did not

monkey with the first four.

It didn't touch them.

It

said, in addition to those four factors there must be
objective uncertainty as to the location of the boundary.
That has nothing to do, according to that case, with what
the owner's think.

The Court said you have to show a deed

conflict, something in the public record as a matter of
title that shows a dispute or uncertainty as the location
of the boundary or you have to show that as a matter of
observing there is uncertainty as to the location of the
boundary.

It's important now that that does not have

anything to do with whether the parties acquiesce in a line
as a boundary or not.
Now in this case, there is no objective on
certainty but there doesn't have to be and we're not saying
there has to, ever has to be. And we have never argued to
your Honor that there has to be objective uncertainty
because there isn't any.

And that requirement is gone.

Halliday versus Cluff was overruled by Staker versus
Ainsworth in 1990 and what Staker did was it overruled
Halliday versus Cluffs fifth element.
objective uncertainty as a requirement.

It deleted
It returned us to

the state of the law as it existed before Halliday verus
Cluff.

It didn' t change the law as it existed before

Halliday versus Cluff.

This is the language on which the

plaintiffs in this case rely for their incorrect assertion

19

that Staker overruled all of the livestock fence cases.
This is the letter.

The court said, "We overrule

Halliday versus Cluff and it's progeny," progeny means
after not before," and it's progeny as to the objective
uncertainty requirement in boundary by acquiescence.
That's not hard language to understand.

It does not say we

have eliminated all of our cases that one must acquiesce
any line as a boundary.

It doesn't say that all of our

cases about fences being installed to contain livestock
cannot be boundary by acquiescence because the parties have
been acquiesced in a line as a swap containment and not as
a boundary.

It doesn't say that.

Now, when counsel gets up again I want him to
read to you where it says any place that the doctrine of a
fence installed to contain livestock can't be bounded by
acquiescence has somehow evaporated.
sense to do that.

It would make no

First, Staker itself doesn't say that.

Second, the Staker formulation of the four elements of the
boundary by acquiescence is verbatim, verbatim the pre
Halliday formulation.

The words are the same.

The Court of Appeals in Jacobs versus Handrum
which was decided after Staker is also instructive.
a 1994 case.

It was

The court have stated "prior to 1984, the

elements of boundary by acquiescence in Utah were the same
as they are today.

The requirement for boundary by

20

acquiescence after Staker in 1990 are the same as they were
prior to Halliday in 1984 %

Now what I'm giving you, your

Honor, are words out of a case that saying what I'm telling
you.

That is not what counsel has done.

He says that

something is there that isn't there.
How much sense does if make that two landowners
want to install a fence to contain livestock?

And that's

their intention and they both admit it as these parties
have.

For a Court to say, no, guys, wrong.

your property.

You just lost

That's the pitch that is being made to you.

It doesn't make any sense.

It's not fair.

The law is not

designed to frustrate the reasonable intentions of people
and these people, by everybody's admission, intended that
there be a division for purposes of separating livestock.
Not for purposes of making a gift of five acres.
Our Supreme Court has, in at least six cases,
stated very clearly that a fence installed for the purpose
of containing livestock cannot be the basis of boundary by
acquiescence.

And, again, I want to read words because I

don't want there to be confusion.

Grace and Roper "the

fence along the west side of the disputed strip was built
for stock control and not as a boundary.

Therefore, it was

not acquiesced in as a boundary by both parties."
Leon verus Dansie, a fence installed to contain
cattle "eliminates any question of boundary by

21

acquiescence".

It's

logical.

about cattle fences.

Staker didn't say anything

And it is true, your Honor, I want to

be candid, there has been no case since Staker that has
addressed a cattle containment fence.
yet.

That hasn't happen

I submit to the Court that that shouldn't be the

issue.

In order for a person to say the law has changed,

you have to point to the language and say where the law has
changed.

That hasn't been done and can't be done here.

But our Supreme Court, if you believe in prophecy answered
the question for us.
Actually, two months before the Staker case was
decided our Supreme Court decided the case of Grace and
Roper v Finlinson.

In that case, just two months before

Staker, the appellant invited the Court to overrule
Halliday versus Cluff.

They raised the issue to the Court

and said please overrule Halliday versus Cluff.

This is

what our Supreme Court said two months before it decided
Staker.

"Even if we were to so limit Halliday, Finlinson

would not prevail here because he cannot satisfy ail of the
elements of Fuelco".

Those are usual four requirements.

The trial court found that the fence along the west side of
the disputed strip was built for stock control and not as a
boundary.

Therefore, it was not acquiesced in as a

boundary by both parties.

This is the Staker court talking

two months before they decided the case that counsel is

22

telling you changed everything.
And the Grace and Roper court is saying even if
we do what they, in fact, did two months later, it doesn't
matter because this is a stock control fence.

It's not a

boundary fence.
I don't know how you wiggle out of that, your
Honor.

Those words, no matter how clever a lawyer is

you've got to be able to say where the words are. And I'm
giving you the words.

That's what they say.

So in contrast to counsel's argument that Staker
eliminated cattle fences we have first, the language of
every formulation of this doctrine with respect to the
forth element is the same.
THE COURT:
argument.

I think I'm with you as far as that

I understand it at this point.

Let me turn to

Mr. Echard MR. MAAK:

Very well.

MR. ECHARD:
your Honor.

Let me address two or three things,

First of all, I'd like to point out that if

you look at counsel's memorandum of cases he just cited you
concerning the cattle, every one of them, the dates are
there, he didn't cite the dates to you but if I can turn to
that page I will cite the dates.
prior to 1990.

Every one of them was

There's not a single case he has cited to

you concerning cattle boundary that predates 1990 and that
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1

was the objection we made during the trial and our argument

2

we've made all along is he is using old cases.

3

THE COURT:

You've made the argument though that

4

Halliday which then gets reversed by Staker, and that

5

Staker in effect undoes the old cases.

6

MR. ECHARD:

As to the uncertainty, yes we did.

7

I didn't talk about Staker in dealing with the cattle fence

8

line.

9

THE COURT:

But don't you agree with the argument

10

that was just made that in effect Staker just undid that

11

fifth element from Halliday and that we're back

12

MR. ECHARD:

13

THE COURT:

14

—

No.
—

with the same statement of law

that we had before?

15

MR. ECHARD:

Let me cite you some language from

16

Staker.

On page 421 of Staker, they are specifically

17

reviewing the Halliday case and what was reversed.

18

quoting the Halliday case they said, "by the same token, a

19

claimant cannot assert boundary by acquiescence if he or

20

his predecessor in title had reason to know the true

21

location of the boundary during the period of acquiescence.

22

Staker specifically overruled that, specifically by quoting

23

the language overruled that.

24

Justice Howe, they quoted Justice Howe in his objection to

25

Halliday when they did Staker because he became the

In

And indicated specifically,

24

majority instead of the minority.

When he said, Justice

Howe concluded in his descending opinion to Halliday, "it
is not unjust in certain cases to require disputed owners
to live with what they and their predecessors have
acquiesced in for a long period of time". And then they go
on and state again that the fact that it was unknown at the
time or that they had reason to know the true boundary
didn't have any effect anymore.

(Inaudible)

Now, if I understand what he is saying and what I
understand the Court said is that even though there
indolence and we met our burden on that, that the fact the
parties knew the true boundaries, defeated our case.
THE COURT:

To the extent I created some

confusion with the use of that word, when I revisit this, I
may need to clarify that.
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

Okay.
What the Court ruling really was

trying to get at there is that I suppose had these parties
been in conflict from the get-go and it was clear that
there was confusion about the boundary line and I don't
want to try to get back into Halliday because I'm not
attempting to do that. But then it's certainly indolence
for one party just to sit back and allow usage of the
property to be made.

But as Mr. Maak has argued —

and I

always apologize when I read your name I want to say Mock

25

1

and it's Maak that you do by.

2

MR* MAAK:

3

THE COURT:

It is, your Honor.
That as Mr. Maak has argued, he is

4

right on in his argument about what my findings were in

5

this case and that is that I have never found —• and I

6

remember this case very clearly.

7

walked out there in the snow arid walked that boundary line

8

and it was well tried by both of you.

9 I very well.

As you both know, we

I remember the facts

What is so obvious when you are out there is

10

that you have a square line that follows the other

11

boundaries that are in the area and it is, they have

12

demarcated from that line to travel a route that made the

13

installation of a stock fence that would stay in place

14

possibly*

15

And as I talked about a few moments ago on this

16

record, there are areas where that could have been done on

17

the old boundary line but you had to go through that big

18 1 swell in the valley area and it is obvious, and I believe
19

there were some pictures shown to this effect that when you

20

go down through the swell that the tension, if you can't

21

maintain tension on the fence that it eventually pops that

22

fence up out of that swell and the cows can walk underneath

23

the fence.

24

testimony and view of the land, caused the fence to be put

25

in in a different location not in anyway to establish a

That problem, and I'm finding from the

26

boundary but simply put in to control stock*
MR. ECHARD: May I make a comment on that?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ECHARD:

Factual.

I didn't make a motion

based upon factual findings of Court but now it gets to
that point.

The Court has to remember there was testimony

that tons and tons of material was taken out of that area
and washed down in the lower area to fill in an unlevel
area.

What you saw was not the condition of that area at

the time the fence line could have been put in. What you
saw was an altered area that was done specifically by
washing water through it and took tons dovm below, plus the
fact the parties testified that there was a fence in place,
you found that were posts in that area. . They testified
that they put the fence back in that area, there is a fence
existing .in that area now so it's not a question of whether
they could, it's a question of maybe whether it was
convenient and I understand that's what the Court's saying.
But to conclude from what you saw up there that day, that
that was the condition at the time the fence was changed is
not supported by new evidence.
THE COURT:

Well, there was testimony to support

that that uneven ground existed and that is why they moved
the fence where they did.
MR. ECHARD: Right.
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THE COURT:

And it is not my recollection that

the testimony was that the washing that occurred took the
ground from the hilly, precisely the area where the fence
could not be put in but there was some washing that took
place

—
MR, ECHARD:

It enlarged it, I think, is what

really happened.
THE COURT:

—

but, back to my findings and this

is what I want to make clear, and I'm not saying that I'm
not willing to look at your case law again.
it.

I'll revisit

I wish that I had revisited it intensely before taking

the bench today and I apologize to you counsel.
know it wasn't on the calendar.

As you

Again, it's that Morgan

snafu we keep running into.
But, the finding of the Court, and there is no
question in my mind that the boundary line was clear to the
parties back then.
back then.
boundary.

There is testimony that it was clear

There's remnants of an old fence along the
But this fence demarcated from that course for

the convenience of putting a stock fence is where they felt
the stock fence could last and be maintained so that the
stock would be controlled.
And so what I'm saying is the argument that Mr.
Maak is making is accurate that that was the Court's
finding and, therefore, what he is saying is that it's not
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1 f a quest ion- of now acquiescing in a new line that was a
2 j disputed boundary line.

That fence was never put in to be

3

the boundary line and so that/ so when I use the word

4

indolence, and I should clarify this.

5

I suppose I was thinking out loud somewhat from

6

the perspective of a land owner that now in hind sight, if

7

I'm over there on the side of the folks that were being

8

represented by Mr. Maak, they might look at it and say well

9

in hindsight we should have gone out there and put up

10

another fence in and seen to it that nobody ever crossed

11

over onto that other property*

12

But, again, I've never found that the fence line that was

13

put in on the angle was intended to be a boundary line*

14

MR. ECHARD:

15

The law does not require that.

16

client to prevail without having to establish that.

17

is the whole point of the law that Irve cited over and over

18

in these memorandums.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

And they didn't do that*,

But that's-my whole point.
It specifically allows my
That

And if I could repeat, and I want to

20 I make sure you know that I understand what you're arguing.
21

You are argument really says, if I can't state again the

22

negative point.

23

clearly, because, again, for the record we were taking

24

about section lines that were those old exact section lines

25

that were very square.

That even if the parties knew very

But even though the parties knew

29

1

that, what you are saying is that even if they put the

2

stock fence in for the containment of stock and it never

3

was intended to be the boundary.

4

MR, ECHARD:

5

THE COURT:

6

time passes

MR. ECHARD:

8

THE COURT:

10

Right.
And that we have now usage made by

not right up to the boundary line -—
MR. ECHARD:

12

THE COURT:

AlmostBut not all the way along the

boundary line.

14

MR. ECHARD:

15

THE COURT:

16

But now that the

Wilkinsons and there was evidence of some crop cultivation,

11

13

A line, whatever.

—

7

9

A line of convenience.

Right.
But, in the kind of upper northern

area of Stan's property and that there couldn't be a

17 i dispute that the stock, if any, that the Wilkinson's had
18

might have gone right down to the fence line that's the

19

stock line so they are in effect coming onto the Babcock

20

property and coming down to that fence line.

21

is that if the Babcocks or their predecessors in interest

22

allow that to take place for the reckless a period of time,

23

it then becomes the boundary.

24

MR. ECHARD:

25

THE COURT:

Your argument

That's correct.
Okay.
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MR, ECHARD:

And I think that law is clear on it*

THE COURT: And you do and Mr. Maak thinks it's
not clear and I am willing to review your case
that you've argued.

law again

Now, can I do this with you?

MR. ECHARD:

Can I make one comment.

I think I

need to find out if the Court is concerned about it being
used for cattle.

He keeps challenging that and that is not

the law in the State of Utah.
of cattle, it's sufficient.

If it is used for imposing

If the Court isn't concerned

about that, I won't spend time on it. But he has
challenged me to site some statements in the case that
address that issue.

He keeps saying that even if you

accept my argument that the use of the land, the disputed
land, for cattle is not sufficient.

That's what I've

pointed out in all of his cases are pre-1990.

The Carter

case specifically was used for the enclosement of cattle
and the Supreme Court decision in Carter specifically talks
about the fact that it was used for cattle. And they did
not find that a basis for reversing it.
MR. MAAK:

That is not my argument, your Honor.

And I'll state this, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Yeah, I didn't understand that to be

there.
MR. ECHARD:
ranch.

Now, what is the big issue on cattle

I don't want to - he keeps saying it's only for the
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1

purpose of cattle.

2

the other elements are met, so we eliminate discussion,

3

that if the property was used for 20 years to enclose

4

cattle that is sufficient then I don't need to go into it.

5

But I've heard him say, last time in the argument and now

6

that that is not sufficient and he challenged me to site

7

some language in Carter that specifically referred to the

8

use of land for the encompassing of cattle.

9
10
11

If he's acknowledging that assuming all

THE COURT:

Do you want to respond to that, Mr.

Maak?
MR. MAAK:

My point, your Honor, is that the

12

Supreme Court has said six times and has never been changed

13

that a fence installed for the purpose of containing cattle

14

rather than as a boundary line cannot provide the basis

15

MR. ECHARD:

16 I

MR. MAAK:

—

All right, I'll address that.
— o n l y be acquiescence.

The fact that

17 I there are cattle occupying the place is not what I am
18

talking about.

19

MR. ECHARD:

20

MR. MAAK:

Okay.
It is that the fence has a purpose

21

different than that of a boundary.

22

divide or contain stock where the land is returned.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. ECHARD:

25

It is a purpose to

That's how I understood it.
And Carter specifically was a fence

that was put in to contain cattle.

And Carter said that
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1

indolence to that fence was sufficient.

The Supreme Court,

2

in addressing Carter, again mentions that it was used for

3

the containment of cattle and for farming.

4

comment that the true owner of the property had observed

And it made the

5 I the land and observed that the fence and all was containing
6

cattle.

7

read the Carter case and the Supreme Court decision.

8

have a copy of the Supreme Court decision on Carter which I

9

can give the Court.

That is clearly an issue in Carter.

I ask you to
I

I think you have the other one. I

10

don't have that one available.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. ECHARD:

I have copies of that already.
Now, the other thing that counsel

13

made a big deal of is that somehow the Supreme Court

14

overruled Carter and that that applies to this case.

15

the Carter overruling of the Supreme Court, that was very

16

clear, that was totally in acceptable land.

17

landlocked.

By

It was

That is not the sort of thing that is involved

18 I in this case.

That was not landlocked. The fence was

19

installed, it was reinstalled.

20

was not convenient to maintain the fence in that area but

21

it clearly is not what the Supreme Court was saying.

22

was saying that it was impossible for the other person to

23

have access to it. And you'll have to read those cases,

24

too.

25

It may have been that it

It

So I think that when we come down to the fact the
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Court, and by the way, I do need to cite to the Court this
thing about indolence.

They cite in here also, if I recall

correctly/ I can't put my hands on it but I stated the
other Supreme Court case earlier that cited that indolence
was sufficient.
that purpose*

You don't have to rely upon Carter for
The Supreme Court recognizes in, prior to

Carter, the case I cited to you in my memorandum and also
recognized in overruling Carter, that indolence had been
previously established by the Supreme Court.
Here it is.

This is the Carter case from the

Supreme Court and it says, In quieting title in plaintiff
the trial court and the Court of Appeals is affirming the
trial court's relied upon Lane versus Walker, 29 Utah2d
1973, where we, the Supreme Court, stated that acquiescence
can consist of indolence and consent by silence.

So, they

didn't touch indolence at all.
So, the only question we really have here as I
see it, I think clearly we showed indolence.

We showed the

knowledge of the predecessors and the other parties that
the fence was being used to—the fence by Wilkinson and
even there had been a comment that Wilkinson was trying to
steal their land and so forth.

They knew the use*

We have

evidence of aerial maps showing that this land had been in
the land bank and had been used almost up to the fence on
the one edge for farming.

All the disputed area was
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1

clearly, not all, the disputed area was used for farming.

2

They knew about that.

3

with the boundary line.

4

with the old fence line but he was farming and grazing the

5

disputed area (inaudible).

6

indolence.

7

They knew that he was not sticking
They knew that he was not sticking

They did nothing.

That's the

It seems to me what the Court has really done,

8

your Honor, is by this line of cases, they've really taken

9

adverse possession and said if you're there for 20 years,

10

they let you adverse possess it without paying taxes. And

11

you heard the cases and that's clear in that area that

12

they've carved out. And that's what's happened in this

13

case.

14

before.

15

line.

16

show is a line acquiesced in for a period of 20 years that

They are saying we don7t care what the line was
We don't care whether or not they knew it was a

We don't have to have a dispute. All we have to

17 ( is occupied and then that settles the problem.

And they

18

cite cases, law reviews and everything that said, gee, what

19

Judge Oak's did in this thing created a huge problem.

20

don't want to fight with this.

21

line has been there for 20 years, it's been used, it

22

belongs to this person so we can get on with life.

23

clearly what the court says.

24

what we have in this case.

25

We

We just want to say if a

That's

And I think that's clearly

Thank you.

Now, as to the other issue, do you want —
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MR. MftAKr

Your Honor,, can I respond?

MR. ECIffiRD: How come he gets to respond?

I

don't think he gets to respond after I respond,
MR. MAAK:

Well, I'm asking for permission.

THE COURT:
MR. MAAK:

You may.
Your Honor, the problem is the cases

don't say what counsel just told you they do.

He hasn't

read, I invited him to do so. He says those, that Carter
was —
MR. ECHARD;

That's nothing new, your Honor, this

is. just reiterating the —
MR. MAAK:

No, no.

He says that Carter versus

Hanrath was all about a livestock control fence. The truth
is there were livestock.

So what?

The point is the court

did not find this fence was installed to contain livestock.
It is a boundary by acquiescence.

I invite counsel one

more time to stand up and show the Court the language
THE COURT:

—

Let me interrupt, this takes on a

little more flavor kind of like a debate where he
challenges the other side to respond.
I'm going to go back to the cases.

I understand

the issue very well and I think you both would agree that
we verbalized here what that issue is.

I don't think there

is a dispute about the Court's findings.

I'm not moving

away in anyway from that finding that I made before.

I'm
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willing to take another look at the case law and I'll look
at it all from top to bottom.
case.

And it's an interesting

I think it's a case, I kind of get the feeling which

ever way it went that itfs going to go up on appeal. And
it's, I think each case that comes up on these boundary
line cases have some unique facts to them.

It's one

they'll have to look at.
MR. MAAK:
THE COURT:
MR. MAAK:

My last point, your Honor.
Okay.
The statement that somehow boundary by

acquiescence has become adverse possession without paying
taxes.

That's just bull-claw.
THE COURT: No, you don't even need to make that

point because I understand already from your argument that
that is your position that that is not where the law has
gone.

That's Mr. Echard^s and that's really where the

split comes between the two of you.
MR. MAAK:

What he says is what the court is

saying that any fence that people occupy up to creates
boundary by acquiescence and he edits out the language
"mutually acquiesced in as a boundary".
THE COURT:

I'll be taking a close look at that.

I understand the issue.
Now, your dispute as to how the other findings
have read, can I suggest that I take a look at this, that
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1

we schedule a phone conference in the very near future to

2

make this decision and can we deal with the other language

3

in the phone conference?

4

MR, ECHARD:

May I just suggest that the best way

5

to do it is to take the precise language of the Court which

6

is very precise and make up the findings?

7

need to augment what you've said*

8

it and whatever you do and subsequently if you do anything,

9

just take that and make the language.

10

I mean we don't

I think you've covered

The problem I have is counsel has, in my opinion,

11

doctored a little bit to try to create things,

12

example, he talks about agreements and a lot of things you

13

don't need to talk.

14
15

THE COURT:

And I will say this.

For

There are

times when I am making a ruling from the bench that 1 may

16 | not cover every detail but they may be findings that are
17 I consistent with what my findings are.

And what I'd like to

18

do, because for me to rule on that and then grant your

19

motion to set this aside doesn't make much sense.

20

like to do is then revisit this with the two of you over

21

the phone and tell you what language I want to go with.

22

MR. ECHARD:

23

MR MAAK:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. ECHARD:

What I'd

Okay.

Okay, thank you, your Honor.
Thank you both.
And may I ask one other thing?

My
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understanding is the status is that the Court sign the
documents with a holding of not been filed so the appeal
time doesn't (inaudible).
THE COURT:
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

That's correct.
Thank you.
It will not start to run until this

has been decided.
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Okay.

Thank you.

(Whereupon the proceedings were adjourned.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT; All right/ are you there?

Okay, I'm

putting it on the speaker phone. Are you able to hear me?
MR, ECHARD:
MR. MACK:

Yes, your Honor.

Just fine, your Honor-

THE COURT:

Okay-

We are on the record now and itfs

my in-chamber's record and this is in the case

of Wilkinson

Family Farm, LLC, versus Lara and Mike Babcock.

And what

is before the Court this morning is a decision or decisions
to be made in some areas*

The first one that I'd like to

deal with is that the plaintiffs in this case have brought
a motion for the Court to reconsider its ruling in the
case.

Is that how you saw that pleading?
MR. ECHARD:

I don't have it in front of me-

I'm

sorry, Judge. We did ask, and I don't know if it's Rule 59
and 60 being combined, I'm sorry, I don't have the papers
in front of me.
MR. MACK:

It was filed a motion to alter or

amend a judgment.
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

Okay.
That's right. Now, we're going to

deal with that one first.

I've reviewed the motion to

alter or amend judgment and the memo in support thereof.
I've reviewed all of the material that has been submitted

1

by both sides in this matter and the Court is denying that

2

motion.

3

ruling and I find that the interpretation of the case law

4

as submitted by your office, Mr. Echard, is different than

5

my understanding of the law and I believe that there is a

The Court is willing to stand on its original

6 I requirement that, the fence that was put in, be intended as
7

a boundary fence and it was, and it's my finding, and Irve

8

made specific findings concerning this, is that it was not

9

ever intended to be a boundary fence but rather a stock

10

containment fence and that there was not an attempt to even

11 I put it close to what the actual boundary of the property
12

was.

13
14

Now, having made that ruling, there was also an
objection to the findings of fact and conclusions of law

15 [ that had been submitted by Mr* Mack and I'd like you, I
16

don't know if each of you have those available, I'm going

17 I to suggest some changes and ask that they be resubmitted at
18 J this point.
19

MR. ECHARD:

20

THE COURT;

21

MR. MACK:

22 I

THE COURT; Okay.

23

MR. MACK:

24
25

Can you hang on, (inaudible).
Sure.

Do you have yours, Mrr Mack?

I do.

Whatever you do, don't change my

picture.
THE COURT:

Your picture?

Oh, the picture won't

1

change-

I'd kid with you more, I just don't know if Mr.

2

Echard is back,

3

MR. MACK:

4

THE COURT;

5

I probably should wait until he gets

back.

6

MR. MACK:

7

THE COURT:

8'

Oh.

I just asked while I'm unopposed.
Okay.

I assume you have your

findings therer Mr. Mack.

9

MR. MACK:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. ECHARD:

I do, Judge.
Okay.
I'm sorry, I can't find anyone

12

available to try to find it for me. Judge, I'll just have

13

to —

14

THE COURT:

Okay. Ifll read the whole paragraph

15 J to you and let you know about the change.

I'm dealing with

16

the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and you have

17

raised some objections to the way in which Mr. Mack had

18

worded those findings —

19

MR. ECHARD: Right.

20

THE COURT:

—and conclusions and some of your

21

objection I agree with and I want to tell you how I want it

22

changed.

23

7, paragraph 16r I want that entire 16th paragraph out and

24

it read "Wilkinson and his predecessors knew that the

25

location of the boundary between the Wilkinson property and

When you go paragraph 7, not paragraph 7 but page

the Babcock property was the true boundary.

Babcocks and

the predecessors knew that the boundary between the
Wilkinson property and the Babcock property was the true
boundary.

Both Wilkinson and it's predecessors and the

Babcocks and their predecessors knew that the slant fence
was not located on the true boundary".
The reason I want that paragraph out is I believe
in the rest of the paragraphs we cover adequately what my
ruling was.

That one goes further and has me finding what

the Wilkinson's knew and there's certainly evidence there
to support the idea that someone could have or should have
known but I'm making a finding as though Wilkinson's
testified or that I knew from their testimony that they
definitely knew what the boundary was and just to say that
goes stronger and it goes further than what 1 was
comfortable with.

Do both of you understand?

MR. ECHARD:
MR. MACK:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
I do.
Okay.

Now, paragraph 17, I want it

to read the boundary between the Wilkinson property and the
Babcock property was neither unknown nor uncertain.

The

way it reads now is "the Babcock property is neither
unknown nor uncertain and never has been unknown or
uncertain" and, again, it's just stating that stronger than
what I want stated.

6

1

MR. ECHARD:

2

THE COURT:

Okay*
I like it written, was neither

3

unknown or uncertain.

4

making these changes, MR.. Mack, so are you getting these

5

down?

6

MR. MACK:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. MACK:

9

THE COURT:

Now, I assume that you'll be the one

I am.
Is that one clear?
Yes.
Okay.

Next is paragraph 19 on page

10

8.

11

predecessors agree that the slant fence would be installed

12

and maintained as a livestock containment fence".

13

that paragraph out *

14

they all came together and had a specific agreement about

15

this slanted fence.

16

Babcock's predecessors intended.

17

of them coming to an agreement together to form an

18

agreement to that affect. Now, one might argue that

19

impliedly everybody understood that back then but that

20

states that differently than what my findings would be.

21

It reads "Babcock's predecessors and Wilkinson and its

I want

I don' t find from the evidence that

I do find that that's definitely what

MR. ECHARD:

But I don't have evidence

I'm not arguing with you* your

22

Honorr but Harry Wilkinson did expressly state that he and

23

Babcock's predecessor's agreed that it be maintained as a

24

livestock containment fence.

25

MR. MACK:

Ohr well

—

1

THE COURT: And —

2

MR. MACK:

3

Ifm not sure I agree with that but

anyway.

4

THE COURT: And I'm not saying that, and I need

5

to clarify something*

I'm not saying that that didn't

6

happen and I'm not making a finding against that.

7

what's a little tricky about me changing these.

8

the record to supposedly undermine the other findings that

9

I've made.

I am aware that that —

That's

I go off

and I think that was

10 I deposition testimony/ wasn't it?
11

MR. ECHARD:

12

THE COURT:

It was.
I was aware of that from the

13

deposition testimony and I will don't have a problem again

14

with it being a stock containment fence.. In fact,

15

arguably, any fence that's even when itJs on boundary lines

16

are stock containment fences.

17

saying?

18

MR. ECHARD: Yes.

19 |

THE COURT:

Do you follow what I'm

But, I do find that the slanted fence

20 J was definitely put in for that purpose and it did not
21 | follow the boundary line, I've already said this, because
22

of the difficulty in following the boundary line with the

23 I undulations of the earth and what those steepness of the
24
25

earth problems created to maintain the fence.
Next is paragraph 20 and that paragraph I want to
8

1

come out also.

2

Wilkinson's predecessors to use portions of the disputed

3

property.

4

constitute any agreement on the part of Babcock's

5

predecessors that Wilkinson's predecessors owned or had any

6

legal right with respect to the disputed property^.

7

one, now that I reread that I'm not sure I have too much of

&

a problem with it*

9

It reads "Babcock's predecessors allowed

The consent and permission, however, did not

That

Let me just look at it one more time.

I think the problem I have with it is the notion

10

that they allowed them to use the property.

I mean, they

11

did but it doesn't appear to me that that there was a

12

formal decision made and that's what that kind of implies

13

is that there was a decision made to allow the use*

14

don't know that 1 really evidence of that. Kind of what it

15

appeared to me is that we've got wide open

16

certainly with large tracts of land and that they fenced it

17

to fence off the stock so they wouldn't get out and they

18

followed the course that was easier to put the fence in but

19

I just, I don't think after that with the hilly and

20

different topography because they weren't attempting to

I

spaces,

21 j farm it themselves, speaking of the Babcock' s predecessors,
22

I just don't think they were paying a lot of attention to

23

what was going on with the property.

24

that they, therefore, allowed Wilkinson to use it but that

25

kind of implies an agreement I think in the way that

And one might argue

paragraph is written.

Do you understand where I'm coming

from, Mr, Mack?
MR. MACK:

I do, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay-

Any questions on your part,

Mr. Echard?
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
Okay.

Twenty will come out.

Those

were the only changes that I wanted to make in the
findings *
MR.. ECHARD: May I ask a question on that, Judge?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ECHARD:

My recollection is I asked that your

ruling make in your, well, at least I don't have a
transcript of it, that specifically found that the
plaintiff admitted early and to the indolence and so forth
be specifically placed in your findings. And it was not in
there.
MR. MACK:
Honor.

I don't think that's appropriate, your

You made a discussion about if this and if that and

maybe this and maybe that and then you made specific
findings that there was*
in here*

There was no objection and that's

But there was no finding that the plaintiff, and

what Mr. Echard is asking you to do is to find that he has
met his burden in establishing his case which is what he is
basing his objection and motion to reconsider.

10

1

MR- ECHARD:

Except that that's what precisely

2

what you said.

3

precisely put in your findings.

4
5

I only asking that what you said be

MR* MACK:

And, your Honor, that is, you said

exactly the opposite at our last hearing,

6

THE COURT:

And I am not going to put that in

7

these findings and I don't want it put in.

8

explain, Mr. Echard, that why I wasn't to make the finding

9

that I thought all these elements had been met and

10

therefore

11

12
13

And I might

—
MR. ECHARD:

No, I'm not asking you to put that

in, —
THE COURT:

No, and I understand that, and my use

14

of the word "indolence", I as trying to use a word that had

15

been used by the appellate court in describing someone not

16

setting up and objecting to someone using the property.

17
18
19

MR. ECHARD:
you found specifically
THE COURT:

Okay, but one of the elements and
—
And whatever specific findings I

20

found about their not interrupting or stopping the

21

Wilkinsons or their predecessors from using the property in

22

whatever way it was used, that I've already found.

23
24
25

MR. ECHARD:

But it's not in any papers, he

specifically excluded it.
THE COURT:

Well, do you want to respond to that,

11

Mr. Mack?
MR, MACK:

Well, let's not speculate, let's look

and see*
MR. ECHARD:

My recollection and I gave the Court

a copy of the transcript and the language is there and I
apologize for not having found that but I didn't realize we
were going to do this.
MR, MACK:

Paragraph 20, Babcock's predecessors

allowed Wilkinson's predecessors to use portions of the
disputed property —
MR. ECHARD;

That's not what happened.

The

Court—
THE COURT:

Just a minute, let Mr. Mack finish

and then I'll let you respond.
MR. MACK:

It also says that Wilkinsons farmed a

portion of the disputed property and that their cattle
grazed up to the disputed property.

Now, what other facts

are there?
MR. ECHARD:

Let me respond.

The Court says the

specific finding that it found that the plaintiff had met
its burden in showing that the other side had been indolent
in its, and I don't recall the exact wording, all I want is
the exact wording.

That is one of elements the Court then

indicated that because this was a fence of convenience

as

opposed to, as has been mentioned before, intended to be a

12

boundary, they knew was a boundary, that they found against
us.

But he found in one issue that we showed the indolence

but he found that that was not sufficient in this case and
that's all I want this to show is that Mr. Mack has
purposely not put that in and knowing the significance of
that particular finding by the Court. And if the Court
felt that it was significant enough that it made a precise
finding on that and we have a right to have that put in,
MR. MACK:

Well, (inaudible), your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, hold on just a moment, and by
the way, I didn't, I don't find that either one of you is
trying to be tricky with the other one and I realize that
in these boundary line cases that you may feel that there
is very, you may feel as attorneys, that there is some very
close calls in terms of what language is used and how it is
viewed.
What I'm concerned about is I don't want
particular phrases to trap overall the finding that I've
been attempting to make in this case. And let me just say
this, the language in paragraph 20 that I took out/ I do
think we need to say that Babcock's predecessors did n o t —
and I'm trying to phrase this as we go, it seems to me they
did not interrupt or —
MR. ECHARD:

Just what you said, that they agreed

to let them, I don't know if you're using the exact
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1 s definition of the statute when you referred to it and
2

that's precisely what you're saying now.

3

your reluctance is in putting in what the Court said at the

4

time that it issued its order.

5

supposed to do.

6
7
8
9
10

MR. MACK:

I don't know what

That's what findings are

And, your Honor, I think you should

tell us what you want.
MR. ECHARD:

By the way, I (Inaudible), counsel,

and that's what I'm doing.
THE COURT:

Yes, you do, and I've heard the

11

arguments on both sides• What I want the facts to show is

12

that the, again, we've already stated that the slant fence

13

was the boundary line, not the boundary line but not

14

intended as the boundary line but rather, as a stock

15

containment fence and that the area between the slanted

16

fence and the actual boundary line between the properties,

17

that the use that was made by Wilkinson was not disallowed

18

by Babcocks or their predecessors and that they did not

19

interrupt that use by Wilkinsons.

20

MR. ECHARD:

Okay.

21

THE COURT: And so the reason I am being somwhat

22

skiddish about the word, use of the word indolent is that

23

when I used that when I was making my findings originally

24

from the bench, I wasn't try to make more of a finding than

25

what I've just said. And it has caused me some concern

14

after the fact that it may be viewed by a court that I'm
attempting to make a finding that is consistent with that
ruling that you've argued about, Mr. Echard, to say that,
therefore, the property boundary should be moved over to
the slanted fence-

And I'm not attempting to do that. And

I am, and frankly indolence is not a word that I ever use
in my day-to-day discussions with people so I was using the
word out of that other case which I thought was the
apellate court's way of describing that someone uses
property and no one comes over and interrupts their usage,
And what I'm really trying to say now is I'm making that
finding that whatever stock grazing might have gone on by
Wilkinson's stock over that fence line, nobody stopped or
interrupted that because, in fact, there, was no fence
allowing the actual boundary line to stop or interrupt it.
MR. ECHARD:

But I think also, your Honor, that I

think you intended at that time, I don't know what you
intended, but anyway, the evidence is also not only did
they have cows, they also raised crops for a number of
years which went up next to the fence,

There's no mention

of that on the disputed piece of property.
THE COURT: And that's my point there is that I
made a specific finding about the crop usage, it didn't go
right up to the fence.
MR. ECHARD:

Right.

15

THE COURT:

But it, there was some crop usage on

a portion of the land-

And I've already made a finding

concerning that. And that's what I'm saying is that I
don't want the use of the word indolence to go outside of
what my specific findings were.
MR. ECHARD:

Well, I think the definition of

indolence as you made specific reference to the case made
clear what you intended but you did make the comment that
you found the plaintiff or the burden as to that issue and
then you made reference to the case.

So I thought it was

pretty clear.
MR. MACK:

Your Honor, may I make a suggestion?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MACK:

Can we put back in the first sentence

of paragraph 20 and state that Babcock's predecessors
allowed Wilkinson's predecessors without objection or
interruption to use portions of the disputed property.
MR. ECHARD:

I strenuously object to that.

I

think he is clearly trying to manipulate your findings on
that because the law is clear that if a person uses
property with permission that you don't read this.

He

didn't give anyone permission, he used it openly and
notoriously and there was nothing done by the other party.
That's different than saying that they gave permission
because the Court has received no testimony at all from

1

anybody that talked about permission being given.

So, I

think, again, that it is clearly inappropriate in the
findings.
MR* MACK:

Well, there was testimony that they

agreed to maintain the fence and the cattle contained the
fence and there was testimony that Wilkinsons farmed a
portion and had cattle graze up to it.
MR. ECHARD:

Yeah, but I think that wording is

better handled the way the Judge worded it just now rather
than saying they gave permission.

That assumes an asserted

position that is clearly not supported by the evidence.
But I think when the Court says that they used it for a
period of time and the Court found that there was no effort
to stop them from using it and so forth,. that it more
appropriately fits the evidence as the Court indicated.
MR. MACK:

Your Honor, would you tell us what

you'd like?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I'm trying to. We're trying

to draft between the three of us over the phone here.

It's

a little bit difficult. Again, the word "allowed" in that
sentence again is more than what I'm finding went on.

I

don't, in other words, if I had had someone take the stand
in the case and said, oh yeah, we always knew where the
boundary line was and this was our stock fence and, yeah,
we knew those guys were over there doing some cropping and
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1

that their cattle wandered over there and we allowed it and

2

we talked to them about it and they knew we were allowing

3

them to do that*

4

evidence in the case.

5

I don't, I didnft receive that kind of

But what I am saying there specifically is that,

6

and I didn't write down my sentence but it's words to the

7

effect that, and I realize that you may not be comfortable

8

with the phrase "did not interrupt" but if it can be stated

9

more succinctly than what I'm stating it, that would be

10

fine.

I think I said something to the effect that

11

Babcock's predecessors did not interrupt Wilkinson, maybe

12

the use of a portion of the disputed property by

13

Wilkinson's precedessors.

14

that's, in fact, what happened.

15

cattle that were able to access that area and there was

16

some crop usage that went on and nobody interrupted.

17

MR. MACK:

18

MR. ECHARD:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MACK:

21

Something to that affect because
I mean there were some

That's fine by me.
That's fine, your Honor.
Okay.
Can I read it, your Honor, so there is

no argument?

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. MACK:

Yeah, let's hear what you've —
I've written down, Babcock's

24

predecessors did not interrupt the use of a portion of the

25

disputed property by Wilkinson's predecessors.

MR. ECHARD:

But except that that's not correct

because the only disputed property is right up to the fence
and he, in fact, used all of it for cows (inaudible).
MR, MACK:

Well, I just wrote down what the Judge

said.
THE COURT:

I wanted to say just that.

Because

when you say that, Mr. Echard, there was a little bit of,
and frankly, I've been out in that type of country and
driven cows around and I'm aware that they'll go about
anywhere when you're trying to make them go somewhere else.
So I'm not saying that a cow couldn't get right down, to
that fence.

But there were some areas with the tall,

really well developed sage brush that, again, I don't know
that anything, I don't even know that the cows went right
down to that fence.
MR. ECHARD:

Well, at that point we had, of

course, that's 20 years or more, closer to 30 or 40 years.
You can't assume because the sage brush is sitting there
now that they didn't go down there later or earlier.
THE COURT:

But again, all I'm able to find is

that a portion of the ground was used not, and I don't
think it's fair to say that all of it was used. And,
again, I've made the finding that to the extent there were
cows that might have been wandering in that direction, the
only thing that would have stopped them would have been a
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1

fence. And that was (inaudilbe) obviously in appellate

2

court.

3
4
5

MR. ECHARD:

Okay.

If you can make sure that's

clearly in the findings then.
THE COURT:

Well, I think that to the extent it's

6

stock containment and the way it exists right now I don't

7

feel that Mr. Mack needs to put that specific of a finding

8

in these findings.

9

just barely read back to me and that will be adquate from

10

I want him to use the wording that he

my perspective.

11

I mean you certainly have the argument that you

12

made factually on appeal that if it's a stock containment

13

fence, it contains stock from a (inaudibles). I mean for

14

someone to argue and I don't think Mr. Mack can argue in

15

good faith that the cows on Wilkinson's side never came

16

down to the fence.

17

I mean, -

MR. ECHARD:

Well, that's the only purpose for

18

putting a portion in there, and I can guarantee you that

19

he'll be citing precisely your findings, saying that the

20

record or transcript is not applicable because you put your

21

finding in a precise language.

22

MR. MACK:

Well, Mr. Echard, I'm putting in

23

precise language because that's what the Judge is telling

24

me and all three of us sitting here know to a certainty

25

there was plenty of area in the area of that slant fence
20

where cattle could not physically get in.
MR, ECHARD:
MR. MACK:

And I don't agree.

Okay.

THE COURT: And that's something that I'll make a
record of here.

I cannot say that I know there were areas

where a cow could not get to.

But I'm also not making a

finding that there, that the cows could get to every area
of that fence.

Frankly, in the time that I walked over and

looked at the property and examined it, I didn't have that
specific question in my mind as to whether there were any
areas of the fence that the cows couldn't get to.
But, in general I think that the appellate court,
and, again, I don't think that a specific finding needs to
be made because I think it was just portions of the ground
that were used by Wilkinson and yet I've already, I think,
made a finding that it was the stock containment fence and
I think that goes both directions.
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:
(inaudible).

Okay.
So, that argument is there

All right, if you'll use that language you

put in, Mr. Mack, and then that's, those are the only
changes I wanted to make in the findings.
I don't recall that there were any changes that
needed to be made in the judgment but I do think that
probably we need to have that resubmitted because I've

21

already signed the judgment and dated it March 30th.
MR. MACK:

Yes, I assumed that any corresponding

changes in the conclusions, and I don't recall that they
were tracked into the conclusions but any corresponding
changes in the conclusions that would, as you've said,
would also be made.

(Inaudible)

MR. ECHARD:
again, your Honor.
to be made

I don't want to go through this

With all due respect, there are changes

—

MR. MACK:

No, that's what the Judge and I were

talking to subject to the findings and I'm just saying he
didn't say anything about the conclusions.

But if the

conclusions track any of the language in the findings, I'm
assuming that that carries over and we don't need to get
into the exact wording of the conclusions.
match the findings.
THE COURT:

They will just

Is that a fair assumption, your Honor?
Well, I'm looking at the conclusions

right now.
MR. MACK:

And they may not repeat all the

findings, I don't any problem.

Some people do, some people

don't and I don't recall it happened in this case.
THE COURT:

Let me take just a moment.

I want to

read those and see if I think there's a problem because I
didn't think anything needed to be changed there.

Looking

at your paragraph 3, Mr. Mack, on the conclusions, page 10.

22

"Babcocks and their predecessors on the one hand, and
Wilkinsons and its predecessors on the other hand knew that
the boundary line between their respective properties was
the true boundary and knew of its location on the ground".
I think I'd like to add the phrase at the end of knew
there, or should have known.
MR. MACK:

Knew or should have known that the

boundaries line between the respective properties.

Is that

what you want?
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. ECHARD: Could we just put should have known
other than knew because that again implies that somehow
there's some evidence that they knew and I don't think that
is supported.
MR. MACK:
Honor.

Well, I don't agree with that, your

All you have to do is look down the fence line and

it's crystal clear where the boundary is.
THE COURT:

Well, not only that but I think with

the evidence that was presented about the old fence post
that were along the boundary line I want it to read knew or
should have known.
MR. ECHARD:

Well, there is no fence line, your

Honor, where the slant fence they are not on the original—
MR. MACK:
THE COURT:

That is not correct.
No, they were on the original fence

23

line, the old ones.
fences.

Well, in fairness, there were two old

There was the old slant fence and there was some

evidence that that fence that was torn out when Babcock put
in the fancy new fence, that there was evidence of an older
fence that ran down the true boundary line and that's why I
want that to read knew or should have known.
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

Okay.
Okay.

The next sentence, the

location on the ground of the true boundary was never
uncertain or unknown to either Wilkinson and his
predecessors or Babcocks and their predecessors.
MR. ECHARD:

Isn't that a repeat?

By doing the

first one don't you eliminate the necessity for the next
one?
THE COURT:

I'll allow that to stand.

MR. ECHARD:

I'm just—

When you said, that (inaudible),

okay.
THE COURT:
minute first.

Let me look at paragraph 4 for a

In paragraph 4 it says in the last sentence

there, both Wilkinson and its predecessors and Babcocks and
their predecessors knew that the slant fence was not
located on the boundary between the Babcock and the
Wilkinson property.

No, I'm going to let that one stand.

I think that is accurate.
The next one, Wilkinson's occupation of the
24

disputed property was with the permission and consent of
Babcock's predecessors.
MR. MACK:

That's the line you changed in the

findings.
THE COURT:

Wilkinson's occupation of the

disputed property was with the permission and consent of
Babcock's predecessors.
MR. ECHARD:

See, that implies that they somehow

need verbal consent to it which you have found they have
not but it had been merely a matter that they did not
object to interfere with.

I would suggest to track the

language that you made in the findings.
THE COURT:

Do you have a suggestion?

I'm a

little uncomfortable with the language, Mr. Mack.

Do you

have a suggestion there for a change?
MR. MACK:

Well, in the conclusions of law, the

factual credit before it is a finding that there was not an
interruption or a complaint about it and that it had
occurred for a period of time because it was visible on the
land.

I believe that that is a legitimate legal conclusion

to be drawn when the only evidence is somebody does
something, it is not objected to, and when people know that
they are using their property.

I don't know how else to

say it.
THE COURT:

Let me throw this language out.

25

1

Wilkinson's occupation of the disputed property was not

2

disputed by Babcock's predecessors.

3

MR, MACK:

4

MR, ECHARD:

5

I think that's factually what the

evidence was.

6
7

That'd be great.

THE COURT:
said.

I said disputed.

I don't know what I

Was not objected —

8

MR. MACK:

9

THE COURT:

Objected not disputed.
Was not objected to.

I don't know why I said it.

I didn't mean

10

disputed.

Wilkinson's

11

occupation of the disputed property was not objected to by

12

Babcock's predecessors.

13

MR. ECHARD:

14

THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Mack?

15

MR. MACK:

16

THE COURT:

17

That's fine with me, your Honor.

No, your Honor.
Okay. The rest of it I'm comfortable

with on the conclusions.

18

The judgment, let me just see if it tracks. No,

19

the judgment appears to be fine. Now, maybe the thing for

20

us to do because I have not changed the judgment, what are

21

your thoughts, Mr. Mack?

22

the judgments.

23

you want to leave it standing with the date I put on it and

24

then you'll submit amended findings of fact, conclusions of

25

law?

I'll start with you in terms of

Do you want to resubmit the judgment or do

And then you'll also be submitting an order on my

26

denial of the motion to whatever that pleading was called.
MR, ECHARD:

(Inaudible).

THE COURT: Alter or amend judgment.

But you

could put a phrase in there, somewhere it has to state that
from this Court's perspective the appeal period begins to
run from the day of my signing of the order denying the
motion to alter or amend judgment.
MR. MACK:

I think that's fine, your Honor.

Why

don't I submit a revised findings and conclusions and a new
judgment for you to enter concurrently along with an order
that recites the judgment as previously entered and it's
not going to be filed and the time for appeal runs from the
judgment that is in fact (inaudible).
MR. ECHARD:

That would be fine with me if you

just had a new one and you signed it again, Judge.

Because

it was signed inadvertantly by you not realizing that there
was an objection filed.

It was filed because of the

county, there was a mixup I think, to indicate that that
judgment date stands would be inappropriate because you
filed this, you know, we're not in a position from a legal
standpoint given the objections to sign it at that time and
we were told it would not be.
THE COURT:
in agreement.

Okay.

That sounds like you're both

The way Mr. Mack started doing it, sounds

like you would be in agreement with that.
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MR-. ECHARD-:

Right.

So the date of the judgment

and the date of your denial of our motion will be the same.
MR. MACK:
THE COURT:
MR. MACK:

One last itemf your Honor.
Okay.
There is an objection to the billed

costs.
THE COURT:
my notes.

Oh, that's right.

I do have that in

As was stated in the memo, what this has to do

with is the Court awarding the deposition fee as a cost
item in the case and I think it was pointed out in your
memorandum, Mr. Echard, that that was a descretionary call
of the Court.
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

It is.
And the Court believes that that is

appropriate for that cost to be included.

I'll just

verbarlize generally, I've included those costs in past
judgments that I've awarded and it certainly appears to me
that it was reasonable and necessary for those depositions
to have been taken in conjunction with this case.
MR. ECHARD:

Okay,

And I assume that Mack will

prepare all three of those rulings subject to me for
approval as to form.
MR. MACK:

I'll just send it to the Judge.

you want to object you can but
MR. ECHARD:

If

—

Well, I know, but I'd like to have
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it sent for my approval as to form so I can review it
before it goes to the Judge.
THE COURT:
Mr, Maak?

Why don't you do both, if you would,

Put it into an approval as to form line on it

for Mr. Echard and then also put the certificate of mailing
and I'll rely, would be in the record here, we'll all rely
on the timing of the certificate of mailing.
MR. ECHARD:

Can I make a comment on that?

It's

not intended to (inaudible) Mr. Mack, but that's in
violation of every rule the Court has adopted.
MR. MACK:

You're wrong.

MR. ECHARD:

The rule, may I finish?

MR. MACK: Yes.
MR. ECHARD:

And I've already had Judge

(inaudible) rule on this issue and make a note as the
presiding judge for this district that it shall not be done
that way.

I've also had the district court judge's Bob

Bailey commented it shall not be done that way.

The party

is entitled to either one or the other.
THE COURT:
MR. ECHARD:

Well, —
Altercation of an eight day

admission to the Court by (inaudible) precisely under the
administrative rules or relying saying that we approved as
to form, but —
THE COURT:

But, Mr.
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MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:
you.

—

is inappropriate.

But, MR.. Echard, let me interrupt

The reason it's inappropriate is that we don't want

to create confusion out there on the part of the receiving
attorney

—
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

Right.
—

when he or she see's

an approval

as to form line and they maybe are real busy and they set
in on their desk thinking they've got the opportunity to
approve or if they don't that it will sit.
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

Right, that's correct.
We just eliminated that because I

just told you how we were going to treat this.

Now, the

only reason I suggested that is I wanted Mr. Mack to send
that over and give you the chance just to sign off and
approve it and it would go through more quickly.

When you

say you're entitled to either/or, if you're not comfortable
with that then Mr. Mack can just do the certificate of
mailing and just go that route.
MR. ECHARD:

Well, if he does, he has to give the

notification to me that I have five days in which to
obj ect.
THE COURT:
MR. ECHARD:

Sure, sure.

And I assume

—

But all we have in this case, again,

is I don't end up in a situation like we were in last time.
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MR. MACK:

Now, Bob, I think that, let me talk

about that.
MR. ECHARD:
MR. MACK:

Okay, but —

Bob, you know what?

You did not say

approved as to form on those findings that were submitted
to you.
MR. ECHARD:

Well, I —

(Over talking)
MR. MACK:

Your objections were not timely and

you submitted a letter to this Judge suggesting that I was
trying to take advantage and I personally

—

MR. ECHARD: Counsel, that's not what we are going
to do now and I'm not interested in arguing the facts.
THE COURT:

No, wait.

Let me say this.

The

reason Mr. Mack's hair is standing up on the back of his
neck is he, and I'm not saying you're saying this, Mr.
Echard, but he's concerned for the record and probably for
whatever is being said to me as the Judge, that we're not
left with the impression that he was trying to slip it
through before you got a chance to object.
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:
you're saying that.

And that's —
Let me state, and I don't think
I made it very clear for the record

that Mr. Mack approached this correctly in terms of
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preparing the findings, conclusions, and the judgment and
submitting them to you.
inappropriately.

They didn't come to me

What sometimes happens here is that an

objection will be filed and it will be filed but somehow I
don't get notice of it as the Judge and then I'm looking at
the pleadings, the requisite time period has passed.

I

sign them and I don't know that an objection has been
filed. And I haven't even gone back to check to see if the
objection that you filed, Mr. Echard, was timely filed.
Yet, frankly, I assumed that it was but even if it was a
few days late, it's fair that we deal with any substanitive
objection that you had.

So, that that's, I don't see

anything wrong with what either one of you have done, okay?
MR. ECHARD: And I'm talking about as of this
date.

On this date I either have to know that I have time

enough to review them and sign them as to approval as to
form or I'm limited to my eight days to object.

I need to

know one or the other because I'm hopeful that we'll get
the language that we discussed.
there is another issue.

But let's just assume that

I've got to know which way and

which operation I'm under.

The problem I have, and this

happens more and more often by attorneys in our district,
and I'm not referring to Mr. Mack at all, is that we are
not given that opportunity.

And in this particular case,

if it is being submitted on an eight day notice then it has
32

to state under the rules that it will be submitted to the
Court in X many days if objection is not filed.

This

notice on the certificate of mailing does not accomplish
that purpose.

So I don't really care which way we do it

but I'd like to know what my perameters are.

If he sends

it to me approval as to form and he certifies to your
Honor, and two days later you decide, Well, I'll sign it, I
think it's what I said, then I've been denied the
opportunity to do one or the other.
THE COURT:

Well, we are not going to do that.

As I understand it, Mr. Mack, you're going to do a mailing.
MR. MACK:

I am-

THE COURT: And in that you are going to put down
statutorilly what the requirement is. Now, this question
does come up, I guess. Are you then going to do that with
the mailing and then hold the pleadings until that time
period is past or are you just going to do the mailing and
send the pleadings into me counting on me to keep track of
whether the time period has past?
MR. MACK:
did last time.

What I will do, your Honor, is what I

That is, I will submit it to Mr. Echard

with a certificate of service and when eight days has
expired, I will send it to you with a letter that says here
are the findings and conclusions.

They were served eight

days ago and I have received no objection.
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MR, ECHARD:

See, and again, I'm not talking

about the last time but the problem we have and it's
broader than just this case, is that when all it shows is a
certificate of mailing to me, that does not put me on
notice that you are going to do it in eight days.

You're

telling me now on the phone but the certificate that is
required is a certificate that says, you know, I'm
submitting it you, you have five days plus three days
mailing to file an objection.
submitted to the court.

If you do not, it will be

And when you just have a

certificate of mailing it does not have additional language
and it has approval as to form, that is not properly
notifying the other attorney that you are exercising that
option.
(Over talking).
MR. MACK:

I guess what I'd like you to do is

have you tell me what this rule is because I am not aware
of any rule like that.
MR. ECHARD:
MR. MACK:

Well, I will gladly try to

—

Because it's Rule 4504 that governs

that, there is nothing what you're talking about in here
like that.

It's not here.

MR. ECHARD:
MR. MACK:
and I'll do

That is the rule though.
Tell me what you would like me to do

—
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MR. ECHARD:

Ifll fax you a copy of the notice

that traditionally you put on these things.
MR. MACK:

If that's the way you do it that's

fine.
MR. ECHARD:

Your Honor, I don't want to go

through on this again, I would like to submit them and not
have any objection about the way it's been done.
THE COURT:

No, I understand that, so here's what

I would like to see you do.

You know it's interesting,

I'll just make this comment that the language we've
included in that Notice that tells someone that they have
five days in addition to the three days that are allowed
for mailing for a total of eight days MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:

Right.
I haven't checked the statute to see

if that's statutory or if that maybe is a —
MR. ECHARD:

It's not quoted verbatim but it

requires that kind of notification.
THE COURT:
have a point.

Well, and so, again, you may both

I think if you would, in this case, Mr.

Mack, if you would include language to that effect that
tells Mr. Echart what the timing is and I hope you're not
confused by what I'm saying here, it's just three days from
the date you are showing that someone is certifying that it
went out of your office, plus five days for a total of
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eight days, the eight days that we are talking about.

And

if you f ll just state that in the notice.
MR. MACK:

I would be absolutely happy to do

that.
MR. ECHARD:
forms for you

—

MR. MACK:
me?

And I'll fax you just one of the

Do you know what I'd like you to fax

Fax me the rule.
Well, Ifll fax you the form that

MR. ECHARD:

used, too, so you'll have both of them.
MR. MACK:

I would like to see why I have to do

that, why in 25 years I have not learned of this
requirement.
MR. ECHARD:

Well, the rule hasn't been in effect

that many years.
MR. MACK:

It's CAA and it's 4-504 and just show

me where it says that.
THE COURT:
MR. MACK:
THE COURT:

Mr. Mack?
Yes, your Honor.
I'm not sure that, I don't have the

rule in front of me, and the rule may not spell that out
and that could be somewhat of a, a prac - in the area we
see it come up a lot in this in the domestic area where
we'll have folks that may not have the rules available to
them and so just the fact you do a certificate of mailing,
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I think we've kind of modified in the direction of having
our notice spell out what it is that the rule sets in
motion when you send the certificate of mailing and that is
to spell out for someone that they have the eight days.

I

kind of suspect that's how it's evolved.
So, again, I'm just asking you from the
perspective that you both have expressed we don't want any
confusion on this one.
So, Mr. Echard, if you'll fax that to him today
that form of that notice that we have used some of in this
District.
Mr. Mack, you might be right, it may not even be
something that's required.

Certainly, with this lengthy

discussion that we've had on the record, I don't think
there can be any doubt about the timing we're talking
about.
MR. ECHARD:

That's correct.

THE COURT: All right, now, anything else that we
need to do at this poing?
MR. ECHARD:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Mack?
MR. MACK:

No, your Honor.

Have, have a lovely

day.
THE COURT:

You guys, too.

I hope I'm not at

fault for making this more difficult than it should have
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been but we're about through with it so —
MR. ECHARD:
THE COURT:
MR. ECHARD:

Okay. Appreciate that, your Honor.
Okay.

Thank you both.

Thank you, bye.

(Whereupon the telephone conference was concluded.)
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MORGAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WILKINSON FAMILY FARM, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
LARA L. and MIKE BABCOCK, and all
other parties known or unknown that may
claim an interest in the real property
described herein,

Civil No. 960000010
(Hon. Michael J. Glasmann)

Defendants.

The trial of this action came on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Michael J.
Glasmann presiding, on December 11 and 12, 1997, plaintiff appearing through its counsel,
Robert A. Echard, and defendants appearing through their counsel, Bruce A. Maak, and the
Court having heard the evidence offered by the parties and the arguments of counsel and

having considered the matters on file herein, and the Court having announced its decision,
now therefore, the Court hereby makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC ("Wilkinson") is a limited liability

company organized under the laws of the State of Utah.
2.

Defendants Lara L. Babcock and Michael Babcock ("Babcocks") are each

citizens of the State of Utah residing in Morgan County, Utah.
3.

Wilkinson and Babcocks own adjoining tracts of land located in Morgan

County, Utah. The legal description of the land owned by Babcocks is as follows:
A tract of land situate in the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter (SElA
NWlA) and the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter (SWK NE14) of
Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
U.S. Survey, Morgan County, Utah, being more particularly described as
follows: The South 525.00 feet of said Southeast quarter of the Northwest
quarter and the South 525.00 feet of said Southwest quarter of the Northeast
quarter of Section 30.
The tract of land described immediately above is hereinafter referred to as the "Babcock
Property." A part of the Babcock Property has been conveyed to others since Babcocks
acquired it, but the portions so conveyed are not at issue in this action. The legal description
of the adjoining land owned by Wilkinson is as follows:
Beginning at Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian: North 160 rods; thence West 320 rods; thence
South 72 rods; thence Southeasterly to the South line of Section 30; thence
East 236.75 rods to point of beginning. Being a portion of the South half of
Section 30.
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The tract of land described immediately above is hereinafter referred to as the "Wilkinson
Property."
4.

The northerly boundary of the Wilkinson Property is coincident with the

southerly boundary of the Babcock Property. For illustrative purposes, following is a
diagram showing the location of the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property in the
vicinity of their common boundary, along with the locations of various fences.
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In this action, Wilkinson claims ownership of the triangular portion of the

property lying within the legal description of the Babcock Property which lies south of a
fence slanting north from the True Boundary, which is identified as the "Slant Fence" in the
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diagram above and will be hereinafter referred to as the "Slant Fence." As used in these
Findings and Conclusions, "True Boundary" shall mean and refer to the boundary between
the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property that is established by their respective legal
descriptions. The location of the "True Boundary" is so identified in the diagram above.
6.

The chain of title to the Babcock Property began with a conveyance from the

United States of America to James Williams during 1897. Title to the Babcock Property
passed from James Williams to Elwood Williams and Mabel Williams, his wife. Elwood
Williams and/or Mabel Williams owned the Babcock Property until 1958, when the Babcock
Property was conveyed to Douglas R. Williams and James E. Williams, who are the sons of
Elwood and Mabel Williams. James Williams and Douglas Williams conveyed the Babcock
Property to Babcocks in 1992.
7.

Each of the deeds after patent covering the Babcock Property, which are

mentioned in paragraph 6 above, describe the southerly boundary of the Babcock Property as
the True Boundary, which is the half section line running east and west of Section 30,
Township 5 North, Range 2 E, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
8.

The Wilkinson family first acquired an interest in the Wilkinson Property

when John Wilkinson and Alice Wilkinson received a conveyance of the Wilkinson Property
in 1935. John Wilkinson and Alice Wilkinson conveyed the Wilkinson Property to Harry
Wilkinson and Dorothy Wilkinson, his wife, in 1955. Harry Wilkinson and Dorothy
Wilkinson conveyed the Wilkinson Property to Harry Wilkinson and Dorothy Wilkinson, as
tenants in common, in 1976. Harry Wilkinson and Dorothy Wilkinson conveyed the
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Wilkinson Property to Wilkinson Family Partnership in 1984 and 1985. Wilkinson Family
Partnership conveyed the Wilkinson Property to Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC in 1995.
9.

Each of the deeds covering the Wilkinson Property that effect the conveyances

described in the preceding paragraph describe the northerly boundary of the Wilkinson
Property as the True Boundary, which is the half section line running east and west of
Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
10.

In all of the deeds effecting conveyances of the Babcock Property and the

Wilkinson Property, the boundary between those properties is described as a straight line
(i.e., a line with no jogs or slants departing from a straight line), that straight line being a
half section line.
11.

Wilkinson initiated this action against Babcocks seeking a determination that

Wilkinson owned the approximately triangular tract of land lying south of the Slant Fence.
A surveyor's description of the disputed property is as follows:
A parcel of land situate in the Northeast quarter and the Northwest quarter of
Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Morgan County, Utah, being more particularly described as follows: Commencing at the West quarter corner of Section 30; thence South 88°42/14M
East 2463.67 feet to the true point of beginning; thence North 00°00'00" East
10.64 feet; thence North 87°41' 19" East 450.84 feet; thence North 79°58'48"
East 126.84 feet; thence North 76°23'47" East 1087.06 feet; thence South
04°38'44" West 343.99 feet; thence North 88°42'14" West 1604.50 feet to the
point of beginning.
The Notice of Lis Pendens recorded on behalf of Wilkinson in this action describes the
disputed property as follows:
A tract of land situate in the Southwest lA of the Northeast lA and the Southeast lA of the Northwest lA of Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East,
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Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lying South of Fox Hollow Subdivision and East
of the Dennis and Lenore Hancock property deeded in Book M79 at Page 551
of Official Records, more particularly described as follows:
Commencing at the Northeast corner of said Section 30, thence North
89°09'43" West 1320 feet, thence South 2350 feet more or less to the South
fence line of Fox Hollow Subdivision, the true point of beginning, thence
following said South line, South 76°23'74" West 1087.06 feet, thence South
79°58'48" West 126.84 feet, thence South 87°42'19" West 450.84 feet, thence
South 00°00'00" East 10.64 feet, thence North 88°42'14" East 1550 feet more
or less to the Southeast corner of the Southwest lA of the Northeast lA of said
Section 30, thence North 290 feet more or less to the South line of Fox
Hollow Subdivision and the point of beginning.
That approximately triangular tract of land (whichever description is accurate) is hereinafter
referred to as the "Disputed Property."
12.

At least three different fences have existed in the vicinity of the Disputed

Property. A very old fence existed on or very close to the True Boundary in excess of 20
years ago in the location marked in the diagram in paragraph 4 as the "Old Fence."
Babcocks installed a fence very close to the Old Fence on the True Boundary during 1996.
In addition, more than 20 years ago a fence was installed by Babcocks' predecessors, which
fence is identified as the "Slant Fence" on the diagram above. The Slant Fence is the only
fence that has existed in the area of the Disputed Property for in excess of 20 years.
13.

The terrain in the vicinity of the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property

is generally rolling hills, but in the area of the True Boundary south of the Slant Fence, there
exists unusually steep, cliffy topography. This steep, cliffy topography has made installation
of a fence along the True Boundary extremely difficult in this area. Any fence installed on
the True Boundary in this area would have been extremely difficult to install and almost
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impossible to maintain. The tension in any fence installed in this area would tend to pull up
posts and wires in the lower areas of the fence, which in turn would allow livestock to
escape.
14.

The topography in the area of the Slant Fence, however, was like the

surrounding topography and allowed easy, convenient fencing and was suitable for a
livestock containment fence.
15.

During the trial, the Court inspected the property at issue in this action. The

Court was able easily to see that the Slant Fence departed from the straight line of the True
Boundary by sighting east down the fence along the half section line lying to the west of the
Disputed Property. That the Slant Fence was not located on the straight line of the True
Boundary is obvious.
16.

The boundary between the Wilkinson Property and the Babcock Property was

neither unknown nor uncertain.
17.

The Slant Fence was installed by the then-owner of the Babcock Property in

excess of 20 years ago. The Slant Fence was not installed to establish a boundary or was not
installed in a location considered to be the boundary between the Wilkinson Property and the
Babcock Property; rather, the Slant Fence was installed for the exclusive purpose of containing livestock on the Babcock Property and preventing livestock from escaping from the
Babcock Property onto the Wilkinson Property. The only reason why the fence in the
vicinity of the Disputed Property was not always installed along the True Boundary was
because of the topography in the area — installation of a livestock containment fence along
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the True Boundary would be extremely difficult, maintenance of the fence would be
extremely difficult, and a fence located on the True Boundary would not effectively contain
livestock. The Slant Fence was installed where it was so that it would effectively and
conveniently function as a livestock containment fence and avoid the extreme topography in
the vicinity of the True Boundary.
18.

Babcocks' predecessors did not interrupt the use of a portion of the Disputed

Property by Wilkinson's predecessors.
19.

The livestock of Wilkinson and its predecessors have, from time to time,

grazed on the Disputed Property up to the Slant Fence. In addition, from time to time,
Wilkinson and its predecessors have cultivated something less than one-half of the Disputed
Property, but such cultivation was not up to the Slant Fence.
20.

In seeking governmental approval for their subdivision, Babcocks did not

include the Disputed Property in their proposed subdivision. Babcocks intentionally excluded
the Disputed Property from their subdivision application in order to avoid objections to
subdivision approval and to enhance the likelihood of subdivision approval and not because
they did not claim ownership of the Disputed Property.
21.

Babcocks and Wilkinson have on various occasions discussed exchanging

various parcels of land owned by each for the mutual benefit of both, including exchanges
involving Babcocks' transfer to Wilkinson of the Disputed Property. However, Babcocks
and Wilkinson never arrived at any agreement under which Babcocks agreed to give up any
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claim to the Disputed Property or to transfer ownership of the Disputed Property to Wilkinson.
22.

Babcocks and their predecessors have paid all real property taxes on the

Disputed Property. Wilkinson and its predecessors have never paid any real property taxes
on the Disputed Property.
23.

Wilkinson and its predecessors occupied up to the Slant Fence for in excess of

20 years.
24.

Wilkinson and its predecessors, on the one hand, and Babcocks and their

predecessors, on the other hand, are adjoining landowners.
25.

Wilkinson and its predecessors and Babcocks and their predecessors did not

mutually acquiesce in the Slant Fence as a boundary between the Wilkinson Property and the
Babcock Property.
26.

Wilkinson caused to be recorded a certain Notice of Lis Pendens relating to

this action, which was recorded in the office of the Morgan County Recorder on December
4, 1996 as Entry No. 71679 in Book M0124 at Pages 385-387.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes and enters the
following Conclusions of Law:
1.

Wilkinson and Babcocks are adjoining landowners within the meaning of the

doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or agreement.
2.

Wilkinson and its predecessors occupied up to the Slant Fence for longer than

20 years within the meaning of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or agreement.
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3.

Babcocks and their predecessors, on the one hand, and Wilkinson and its

predecessors, on the other hand, knew or should have known that the boundary line between
their respective properties was the True Boundary and knew of its location on the ground.
The location on the ground of the True Boundary was never uncertain or unknown to either
Wilkinson and its predecessors or Babcocks and their predecessors.
4.

The purpose of the Slant Fence was always and exclusively to contain live-

stock and not to establish a boundary. The Slant Fence was located where it was because a
livestock containment fence could not effectively be installed and maintained on the True
Boundary. Babcocks' predecessors and Wilkinson's predecessors agreed that the Slant Fence
would be used and maintained as a livestock containment fence. Both Wilkinson and its
predecessors and Babcocks and their predecessors knew that the Slant Fence was not located
on the boundary between the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property.
5.

Wilkinson's occupation of the Disputed Property was not objected to by

Babcocks'predecessors.
6.

Neither Babcocks nor their predecessors ever agreed with Wilkinson or its

predecessors to give up any claim to the Disputed Property or to convey the Disputed
Property to Wilkinson or its predecessors.
7.

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or agreement does not apply in this

8.

Babcocks own the Disputed Property free and clear of any claim of Wilkinson

action.

and its predecessors.
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9.

Wilkinson's Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits

and Babcocks should be awarded their costs.
10,

The Notice of Lis Pendens recorded by Wilkinson with respect to this action

should be released and discharged.
MADE AND ENTERED this 3&

day of October, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Midj^f J. Glasmann
District Judge
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL

TO: WILKINSON FAMILY FARM AND ITS COUNSEL:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for defendants Babcocks will
submit the foregoing to the Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this

day of September, 1998.

Bruce A. Maak
Attorney for Defendants Babcocks
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
was served this "^&" day of-Oeteber, 1998 by mailing on said date copies thereof by
United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to:
Robert A. Echard, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
2491 Washington Boulevard, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Melven E. Smith, Esq.
Smith, Knowles & Hamilton
Attorneys for Defendants Babcock
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403

{

Kris Henriod, Secretary

